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Conclusion
Confronting Market Failure

In the early decades of the twenty-first century, old problems afflict new
media. Once again, America anguishes over the diminished democratic
promise of its communication technologies.• Like broadcasting in the 1940s,
digital media have become dominated by oligopolies driven by a corporate
libertarian logic at odds with public interest principles. ~ Recent scholarship
has linked these ownership structures ro various shortcomings with American
broadband, including disparities among communities and socioeconomic
groups in terms of speeds and access, costs for service, and impediments to
free-flowing information and content.J just as radio's full democratic potential was thwarted by commercial capture in the 1930s and 1940s, a similar
fate faces the Internet today. This crisis in digital media coincides with the
gradual collapse of journalism's last major institutional bastion: newspapers. Commercial journalism's contradictions were left unresolved in the
1940s, only to erupt in crisis once again in our present times. Now, as then,
the newspaper industry faces a structural crisis and intense public scrutiny.
However, unlike the 1940s crisis, the one today is likely a mortal blow to the
' I discuss some of these themes in Victor Pickard, "The Grear Evasion: Confronting Marker
Fnilure in American Media Policy," Critical Studies in Media Commstnication, 2014, DOl:
tO, 1080/t 519503 6.l.Ol4•9 19404.
• For a similar historic;~ I pattern, sec Tim Wu, The Master Srvitch: The Rise and Fall of lnformatioll
Empires (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2.010). Wu describes a "cycle" in which every major
American information industry, beginning wirh the telephone, has ultimately been taken over by
carrels and monopolies
' Sascha Meinrath,james Losey, and Vtcror Pickard, "Digital Feudalism: Enclosures nnd Erasures
from Digital Rights Management to rhe Digital Divide," CommLarv Conspectus: jounral of
Conmumications Lmv and Policy 19 (l.oto): 423-79; Robert McChesney, Digital Discomrcct:
How Capitalism Is Turning the bltcmet against Democracy (New York: New Press, l.O 13); Sus:m
Crawford, Captive Audic11ce: The Telecom Itrd11stry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded
Age: (New Haven, Cf: Yale University Press, J.013).
Z.IZ.
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industry, and rebranding self-regulatory measures as "social responsibility"
will not save it this time.
The 1940s media policy debates are instructive for policy makers as they
confront these crises. These earlier debates, to varying degrees, all focused on
buffering media's public service mission from undue market pressures. And
nearly all of them were resolved in ways that aligned with a corporate libertarian logic that benefited commercial broadcasters and publishers. The 1940s
saw a discursive narrowing of possibilities for meaningful public interest
requirements and noncommercial alternatives. Similar parameters are at work
in today's policy discourse.
This discursive narrowing presents policy problems in two broad, overlapping areas: digital media and journalism. Before I examine potential policy
interventions for supporting public service media, I briefly discuss three conceptual areas that were implicit in earlier policy debates but rarely addressed
direcdy: public goods, market failure, and policy failure. Understanding these
political economic relationships is the first step toward renegotiating the corporate libertarian paradigm. Integrating these concepts into our political discourses, practices, and institutions might encourage the implementation of
sound public policy for the media system our democracy requires.
Public Goods
A growing number of scholars have argued in recent years that the information
produced by news media should be treated as a public good.i Because public goods are nonrivalrous (one person's consumption does not detract from
another's) and nonexcludable (they are difficult to exclude from free riders),
they do not operate as other commodities do, such as shoes or cars, within a
capitalistic economy.' They are, in the words of one economist, "both unique
and fascinating because it is virtually impossible to allocate a pure public good
through market mechanisms."~ Journalism is not only a public good in an
economic sense (especially in its digital form); it a lso serves "the public good"
in a socially beneficial sense. Put differently, journalism produces positive
• James Hamilton, All tl1e News That's Fit to Sell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2.006 ), 8-9; Victor Pickard, Josh Steams, and Craig Aaron, ..Saving the News: Toward a
National Journalism Strategy," in Changing Media: P11blic /merest Policies (or the Digital Age
(Washington, DC: Free Press, 2.009), 1-9; Robert McChesney and John Nichols, The Death and
Life of American ]oumalism: The Media Revo/11tion Tbat Will Begin the World Again (New
York: Nation Books, 2.0 10), 101-3; Paul Starr, .. Goodbye to the Age of Newspapers (Hello to a
New Era of Corruption)," in \Viii the Last Reporter Please Tum 011t the L1ghtsr The Collapse
of]omnalism and \'flhat Ca11 Be Done to Fix It, cd. Robert McChesney and Victor Pickard (New
York: New l'ress, 2.0 1 t ), 31. See also B3ker, Media, Markets and Democracy, 8.
' Paul Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Rev1crv of Eco11omics and Statistics
3 6 (1954): 387-9·
• Paul Trogen, "Public Goods," in Handbook of Pt~blic Sector Economics, ed. Donijo Robbins
(New York: Taylor & Fr3ncis, ::.oos), 169-2.07.
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externalities (benefits that accrue to parties outside of the direct economic
transaction) - such as increased knowledge and an informed populace - that
are vital for a democratic society. Goods that produce such tremendous positive externalities are sometimes referred to as "merit goods," which society
requires, but that individuals typically undervalue (are unable or unwilling to
pay for), and rhus the market under-produces. 7 As an essential public service
with social benefits that transcend its revenue stream, journalism is such a
good. In its ideal form, it serves as a rich information source for important
social issues, an adversarial watchdog over the powerful, and a forum for
diverse voices and viewpoints.
Like many public goods exhibiting positive externalities, journalism has
never been fully supported by direct market transactions; it always has been
subsidized to some degree. Since the late nineteenth century, this subsidy has
primarily drawn from advertising revenues.R Today, this business model is
increasingly unsustainable, as audiences and advertisers migrate to the Internet,
where ads sell for a mere fraction of their paper-based counterparts. Despite
their growth, digiral ad revenues have not offset the enormous losses from
traditional advertising. A 2.or:z. Pew study found that declines in print ad rev·
enues, which had fallen more than so percent since 2.003, exceeded the gain
in online digital revenue by a ratio of greater than ro to r.~' The 2.013 report
found some stabilization, but the growth in digital advertising "does not come
close to covering print ad losses." ' 0 These and other data suggest that as a
suppon system for journalism, ad revenue-dependent models appear to be
increasingly unviable, and no other commercial models, including digital paywalls (online subscription models), are filling the vacuum. '' The inadequacy of
commercial support indicates what should be obvious by now: The market's
• !thank Chris Ali for bringing the concept of merit goods to my :mention. For an cxcdlcnt dis·
cussion of their implications, sec Chris Ali, "Where Is Here? An An:alysis of Localism in Medin
Policy in Three Western Democracies" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, :z.oiJ).
Des Frccdm:an simil:arly argues that medi:a products, like preventive health cnrc services, nrc
merit goods since individunl consumers are likely to underinvest in them. Sec The Politics of
Media Policy (Cambridge: Polity Press, :z.oo8), 8-Io. Sec also Rich:ard Musgr:ave, The Theory of
Public Fiuauce: A Study in Pl4blic Ecouomy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), 13-1S·
1
This ch:aractcrization of :tdvertising as subsidy might be disput:able, bur I :am using it to drive
home the point that :tdvertisers were not paying for news media directly; they instead were
paying to h:ave access to eyes and ears. News wns produced :as a kind of by· product, :1 positive
extcrnnlity from the m:ain exchnnge.
• Rick Edmonds, Emily Guskin, Tom Rosenstiel, :and Amy Mitchell, "Newspnpcrs: By the
Numbers," The Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Joumalism: The State of the
News Media ~01~. ncccssed February :z., :z.ot3, hnp:/lstatcofrhemedin.org.
' 0 Rick Edmonds, Emily Guskin,Amy Mitchell, nnd Mark Jurkowitz, The State ofthe Ne1vs Media
zo 1 J, http:/lst:a teofthemedia .orgllo 1 3/newspn pers·stahi lizing·but·still·threntened/ The :z.o 1 4
Pew Report found that while other sources of revenue nrc growing such ns capitnl investment
and philanthropy, they account for n me:ager I% of the current financial support for news.
" Victor Pick:trd and Alex Williams, "Snlvntion or Folly? The Promises nnd Perils of Digital
l'aywnlls" Digital ]oumaltsm, ~ (1) 10 14, 19S- :I.IJ.
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systematic under-production of journalistic media qualifies as a clear case of
market failure. u
Market Failure
Deriving from neoclassical economics, "market failure" is an analytical framework that typically refers to a scenario in which the market is unable ro effi·
ciendy produce and allocate resources, especially public goods.'J This often
occurs when private enterprise withholds investments in critical social services
because it cannot extract the returns that would justify the necessary expendi·
cures, or when consumers fail to pay for such services' full societal benefit. This
scenario legitimates state intervention in the provision of public education, a
standing military, a national highway system, and other essential services and
infrastructures not supported by market transactions. The leading consumer
advocate and researcher Mark Cooper has made a convincing argument that
various kinds of "pervasive market failure" specifically affect the media industry. In addition to the lack of support for externalities and public goods, other
market failures that frequently occur in the American media system are associated with structural flaws like oligopolistic concentration and profit maximization. Uncompetitive markets may lead to perverse incentives and the abuse
of market power, which can result in a media system's degradation, including a
failure to provide adequate interconnection between communication networks,
communication services to all of society, and quality journalism.'•
In the 1940s, market failure was evidenced by the rise of one-newspa·
per towns and a loss of local journalism. Signs of market failure in today's
American media system are increasingly visible in the ongoing disinvestment
in news production, exemplified by the reduction of home deliveries of leading

" I generally define journalistic media as based on news gathering that generotes new informotion
a bout socially signifie:~nt issues.
'' See, for example, Francis Bator, "The Anatomy of Market Failure," Quarterly Journal
of Economics 71, no. 3 (1958): 351-79; joseph Stiglitz, "Markets, Marker Failures, ond
Development," Americatt Economic Review 79, no. l. (1989): 197-1.03; Steven Medema, "The
Hesitont Hand: Mill, Sidgwick, and the Evolution of the Theory of Market Failure," History
of Political Economy 39. no. 3 (1.007): 33 I-sS; john Taylor, Economics, sth ed. (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1007), 1 S· See also Allan Brown, YEconomics, Public Service Broadcasting,
and Social Values," Journal of Media Economics 9, no. I ( 1996): 3-15.
•• Mark Cooper, "The Future: of Journalism: Addressing Pervasive: Market Failure with Public
Policy," in \Viii the Last Reporter Please Tum Out the Lights/ The Collapse of Joumalism
attd What Carr Be Done to Fix It, ed. Robert McChesney and Victor Pickard (New York: New
PrC$s, 10 1 1) 31.o-39· See also Mark Cooper and Barbar:~ Roper, "Reform of Financiol Markets:
The Collapse of Market Fundamentalism and the First Steps to Revitolizc the Economy"
(Washington, DC: Consumer Federation of America, March 1009). To be fair, different market
structures may experience some of these foilures, but behavior like profit maximiz:~tion is particulorly problematic in noncompetitive markets because it often results in too little production
ond consumption from society's perspective because the price is set above marginal cost.
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metro dailies like the Cleveland Plaitt Dealer and the New Orleans TimesPicayune - the latter in a city where approximately a third of its residents
lack Internet connectivity. ' ' Whether discussing the lack of support for local
journalism or deficiencies in providing universal access to affordable and reli~
able Internet service, a focus on market failure deserves more prominence in
American media policy discourse. Indeed, that media policy even requires a
"public interest" category is arguably an implicit acknowledgmem of endemic
market failure in commercial media. Yet an explicit discussion of this subject,
especially its role in the journalism crisis, has been noticeably absent among
policy makers, a condition that leads us to policy failure.
Confronting Policy Failure
The concept of policy failure is underrheorized in the scholarly literature;''
here it refers to existing policy mechanisms' insufficiency in dealing with significant social problems including market failure. Beyond policy makers' lack of
political will or incentive to act, a number of complications inherent to media
policy debates combine to encourage such failure by masking the policy roots
of media-related problems.
First, there is the invisibility of media policy. Because so many policy-making
processes remain hidden, citizens' relationship to government and the connections between policy and politics in general are obscured. The political scientist
Suzanne Mettler highlights aspects of this phenomenon with her very useful
formulation of what she calls a "submerged state," in which the state is involved
in people's daily lives in profound ways that are rarely recognized. ·~ Whereas
Mettler is drawing attention specifically to policies impacting households' economic security such as retirement benefits, •• the influence of the invisible state
extends to countless rules and infrastructures including subsidized mortgages,
road maintenance, and safety standards. Further, when stare intervention is
acknowledged, it is often stigmatized for providing "handouts" to disadvantaged (and presumably undeserving) groups. Even expenditures benefiting the
general public (public education, public media, public arts) are held suspect,
while the more prevalent policy intervemions that aid corporations (tax breaks,
relaxation of antitrust laws, intellectual property protections) often remain
invisible and unscrutinized, or even applauded. Misunderstandings about these
largely hidden policy relationships lead to a distorted view of government's
regulatory role in society.
'1

The Picayune has since resumed d;uly delivery, but at a much diminished capacity.
•• Not to be confused with the concept of "government f:ulure," which refers to those goods and
services that governments arc typically unable to provide.
' Suzanne Mettler, The Submerged State: Ho1v Invisib le Govemment Policies Undermi11e
America11 Demo cracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 0 11 ).
1
Mettler notes that her framework of an invisible state can be applied more broadly. Sec The
Submerged State, r 5.
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In particular, there is much confusion around how government regulates
media, which is often elided by celebrations of new technologies and other
forms of technological determinism. A widespread assumption is that if society simply allows inventors and entrepreneurs to develop new technologies,
the communication system is self-correcting. This ignores market constraints
and the state's ever-present role. The Internet's genesis is a classic case. Its
early development was largely dependent on state subsidies via military and
research institutions, but many see the Internet as a wild, unregulated terrain
that emerged naturally from new technologies, market forces, and individual
genius. To the contrary, government is inextricably involved at all times, from
enforcing copyright laws (often seen by corporations as "good regulation")
to applying antitrust laws (or lack thereof). The general confusion about government's regulatory role in everyday communication, combined with policy
makers' lack of motivation to raise awareness, discourages public involvement
in critical policy debates.
This leads us to the problem of policy inaction - what the political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson referred to as "drift." '~' Drift emphasizes policy failure's effect on society over time - how problems often worsen
when regulatory agencies do nothing. For example, in the 1940s, as negative
externalities such as excessive commercialism in the American media system
increased, government could have intervened by applying structural measures
like antitrust legislation to break up conglomerates or, with broadcast media,
mandated stringent public interest obligations in return for using the public
spectrum. But such systemic interventions rarely occur, as a result of both institutional inertia and calculated neglect. Moreover, given what might be called a
"submerged state syndrome," the public is unlikely to call for affirmative regulatory intervention. This perceived absence of the state has concrete policy out·
comes by limiting the range of possible trajectories in the public imagination.
Consequently, vacuums emerge within policy discourses that allow imbalances
to continue unabated, particularly given the assumption that a media system
has developed according to the natural laws of the market and technological
progress. Corporate libertarianism thrives in this discursive environment.
A third major factor that distorts policy discourse and practice is what I
referred to earlier as "regulatory capture." This process is often subtle, involving not only media corporations' significant donations to politicians and their
campaigns but also the sheer boots-on-the-ground power of having legions of
lobbyists crowding the halls of Congress and key regulatory agencies. A media
reform advocacy group calculated that in 2.009, amid net neutrality and other
key telecom policy debates, six leading telecom and cable companies and their
lobbying firms employed more than 5 50 lobbyists - working out to more than

•• jacob Hacker and Pnul Pierson, Witmer Take All Politics (New York: Simon nnd
Schusrcr, 201 o ).
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one lobbyist per member of Congress - and spent more than $70 million on
telecom lobbying in Washington, DC, alone.' 0
Perhaps even more significant than direct payoffs to politicians is the
much-lamented revolving door phenomenon. Already operative in the 1940s,
this shuffling of personnel between the Federal Communications Commission
and the communication industries it is meant to regulate remains a common
practice. One recent analysis found that of the 2.6 commissioners and chairs
who have served on the FCC since 1980, at least 2.0 have gone to work
for corporations in the industries they previously regulated. 1 ' Some cases
have been quite blatant, as when the former commissioner Meredith Atwell
Baker left the FCC to become a Comcast-NBC lobbyist not long after voting to approve those companies' mega-merger. She is now president of the
leading trade group for the wireless telecommunications industry, CTIA-The
Wireless Association. Similarly, the former FCC chairman Michael Powell
now heads the cable industry's top trade association, National Cable and
Telecommunications Association (NCTA). The current FCC chairman, Tom
Wheeler, formerly headed both NCTA and CTIA, and was a top-level political donor for President Obama. This regulatory capture contributes to a
"discursive capture," yielding master narratives that systematically write off
alternative policy options such as subsidizing public media and breaking
up oligopolies. Much of this ideological framework began to congeal in the
1940s and remains operative today, which leads to a fourth major constraint
on media policy discourse.
America's corporate libertarian ideology fails to recognize public goods
and down plays the existence of market failure. This, in turn, encourages seemingly commonsensical notions about self-regulation, which, upon reaching the
level of ideology, a re difficult to dislodge. C. Edwin Baker observed two arguments that have long been used to discredit state intervention in cultivating a
vibrant media system: that the government has no legitimate role in markets
and that the First Amendment specifically forbids government intervention in
media markets ... T he ideological work that turned these arguments into truisms was still not complete in the 1940s - and such arguments continue to
require constant maintenance and repair - but thinking outside their confines
today is exceedingly difficult. Des Freedman dubbed these phenomena "media
policy silences," which he defined as the "ideological processes of exclusion
and marginalization that distort media policy making and undermine the

.., Sec "Telecom Lobbying," Free Press, hnp://www.freepress.net/lobbying. Telecom lobbyists arguably have even more influence at the state level where they pressure legislatures to place con·
straims on municipal broadband services. See Jon Brodkin, "lSI, lobby has already won limits
on public broadband in 2.0 states," Ars Tee/mica, February 12., 2.014.
" Personal correspondence with Timothy Karr of Free Press, May 2., 2013.
" Sec generally, Baker, Media, Markets and Democracy; Med1a Co11CC11tratio11 and

Democracy.
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emergence of alternative paradigms and policy outcomes."'' Taken together,
these discursive impediments obscure the policy roots of social problems, mask
market inefficiencies in providing for society's communication needs, and narrow the possibilities for alternative policy trajectories - all leading to policy
inaction and, ultimately, policy failure.
Return of the Nervous Liberals
These corporate libertarian assumptions, first crystallized in the r 94os, continue to permeate American policy discourse, thereby diverting attention from
a structural analysis of the media system's problems,14 This is true even of relatively liberal initiatives like the FCC's 2.01 I report, "The Information Needs
of Communities," which offered a highly critical assessment of American news
media's failures but - perhaps fearful of its own logical conclusions- repeated
the Hutchins Commission's errors by prescribing only a minor role for public
policy in addressing the journalism crisis.~s A few days after the long-awaited
report was issued, its author defended the study's laissez-faire approach to a
group of public advocates, arguing that more aggressive policy intervention
was inappropriate for two reasons: first, because the government should not be
choosing winners, and, second, because the First Amendment forbade it,16
This defense sounds remarkably familiar to C. Edwin Baker's description
of commercial media firms' standard anti-regulation arguments, and it shows
to what extent a corporate libertarian logic is internalized even within the
thinking of liberal policy makers. These familiar arguments are also demonstrably false. The government is always involved in markets, though often on
behalf of corporate interests - a glaring contradiction in corporate libertarianism. Indeed, the American commercial media system could not operate without the state. Particular kinds of state intervention - copyright, relaxation of
media ownership restrictions, and generally any measure that privatizes what
had been previously in the public domain (such as the public airwaves)- are
embraced, whereas any measure that aims to curb profit-seeking behavior is
'' Des Freedman, "Media Policy Silences: The Hidden Face of Communications Decision Making,"
Intemaltonal Journal of Press/Polittcs 15, no. 3 (:z.o1o): 344- 61.
.. Brett Gary used the phrase "nervous libernls," first coined by Archibald Macleish, to describe
postwar libernls whose selective ttdherencc to First Amendment freedoms allowed them to effortlessly switch from targeting fascists to blttcklisting leftists during the ensuing Cold War hysteria. See Gary 's The Nervo11s Liberals: l'ropaganda A11xieties from World \Var Ito the Cold
War (New York: Columbitt University Press, 1999). I have ttdapted the term to describe libemls
made nervous by their own conclusions when they stray into a structurttl critique of commercial
media.
'' Steve Waldman, The !rtformatioll Needs of Comnnmities: Tbc ChattgiTtg Media Lattdscape ;, a
Broadband Age (Washington, DC: Federal Communi~ tions Commission, :z.oi I), www.fcc.gov/
infoneedsreport.
·~ Steve Waldman, F11t11re of Media Report Pt~blic lrrtercst Brie{i11g with Steve \ValdmaTt, New
America Foundation, Wttshington, DC, june I 4• :z.o I I.
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scorned as regulatory and therefore anti-free market. Furthermore, a proscription on government intervention in media stands on a highly dubious reading of
First Amendment freedoms . Given important legal precedents like the Supreme
Court's AP decision, government intervention can be justified to ensure a structurally sound and protected press system.
Indeed, a long-standing - if little recognized - tradition exists in which the
American government affirmatively mandated that media systems serve public
needs. We see this vision briefly take hold in the 1940s and make subsequent
appearances in the 196os, but it traces back to the American republic's earliest
days. Richard John's magisterial history of the U.S. Postal Service - a communication network that initially served primarily as a newspaper-delivery infrastructure - demonstrates this precedent. ' 7 In the first major American media
policy debate, the federal government determined that it should privilege the
postal system's educational purpose over fiscal considerations, and thus heavily
subsidize it. Given the postal system's vital function, the notion that it should
be entirely self-supporting was seen as absurd. In recent decades, however,
most elite policy discourse has been hermetically sealed off from such ideas,
and what was once nonsensical - that media the market no longer supports
should be left to wither - is now commonsensical. The first step toward undoing the corporate libertarian paradigm is to realize that government has a legit·
imate duty to step in where the market has failed. This will require reaffirming
what was once better understood: Affirmative media policy based on positive
liberties is entirely consistent with American history and democratic ideals.
Once the political opportunity arises, reformers will have a rich alternative
tradition of positive press freedoms to draw upon, thereby realigning the First
Amendment with a more progressive policy orientation.
Policy Reforms for Digital Media
The future of media is a digital one, yet as a society we are still grappling with
the implications of this transformation. It would be comforting if concerns
about media ownership and public interest obligations no longer mattered in
the age of the Internet. For many, caring about the future of news media might
seem quaint and anachronistic given the ubiquity of digital communications.
But despite dramatic technological changes, similar policy quandaries remain,
especially as we witness a new wave of digital media monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. •H The commercial Internet faces a norm-defining moment not
unlike that of commercial radio in the 1940s. Such moments require normative
" Richard John, Spreadi11g the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse
(Cambridge, MA: Harv:ud University Press, 1995).
1
'
For a provocative argument on how we as a society should respond to these Internet car·
tds and monopolies, sec Robert McChesney, wlk Realistic, Demand the Impossible: Three
Radically Democratic Internet Policies," Critical Studies in Media Communication, 4014, DOl:
!0. to8o/t 549SOJ6.:!.014·9 I 3 8o6.
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questions: What is the Internet's role in a democratic society? How can the
public interest be protected in this digital media system? What is government's
role in regulating that relationship? Thus far we have failed to address these
questions adequately.
Actualizing this new digital media system's democratic potential requires a
paradigm shift. It requires moving away from corporate libertarianism toward
a framework that recognizes the public-good qualities of media and embraces
government's affirmative role in providing for society's communication needsespecially as systemic media market failure becomes increasingly evident.
Nearly a third of all U.S. households still lack broadband Internet, at least
partly owing to prohibitive cost.·~ Even for those with access, services are subpar and costly in a global comparison. Among leading democracies, American
broadband is the seventh most expensive, and nineteenth in terms of speed. In
terms of Internet penetration, the United States ranks fifteenth internationally,
having dropped sharply over the past decade.Jo In terms of cost, the U.S. ranked
3oth out of 3 3 countries, with an average price of $9o/month for higher speeds
of 45 Mbps and over.l' The average American broadband customer currently
pays more than $4o/monrh for 2 7 Mbps, while an average South Korean pays
a fraction of that price for 70 Mbps.J• A more recent report exposes the degree
to which American cities lag in broadband speeds and prices behind other cities
around the world. For example, the same broadband speed that fetches $21.75
in Riga, Latvia, costs $1 u..50 in Washington, DC.H
Given that duopolies presently dominate both the wired (Comcast, Time
Warner)H and wireless (Verizon, AT&T) U.S. markets, it is reasonable to
assume that a lack of competition plays an important role in this predicament.H
.. Pew Research Center, Home nroadba11d 20 r J http://pewintcrnet.org/Reporrs/:to Jj/Broadband.
aspx (accessed October II , 1013 ).
10 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Fixed and \Vircless nroadba11d
Subscriptions per 100 lt~habitallts, Annual Report, 2012 ed., hnp://www.occd.org/stil
broadb:mdiid·OECD-WiredWirclessBB·10ll.·t1_V1.XIs (accessed October JI,10IJ).
,, Tom Geoghegan, Why Is Broadband More Expensive in the US? nne News Magazi11e. October
17, 1013, httpl/www.bbc.co.uklnews/magazine·14 p8 38 3.
•• Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Avr:ragc Advertised Download
Speeds, by Country, Annual Report, 101 t ed., http://www.oecd.org/stilbroadband/BBPortal_sa_ t 3july_Final.xls (accessed October n, :z.o t 3 ).
II Hi bah Hussain, Danielle Kehl, Patrick Lucey, and Nick Russo, "The Cost of Connectivity 1013
Data Release: A Comparison of High·Speed Internet Prices in 24 Cities around the World"
New America Foundation, October 2013. http://oti.newamerica.net/publications/policy/the_
cost_of_conncctivity_l.OIJ. Sec also Edward Wyatt, "U.S. Struggles to Keep Pace in Delivering
Broadband Service:," Nerv York Times, December 19, l.OIJ .
•• If the proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner goes through, this predicament may
worsen.
II For an international comparison of mobile internet services, sec Hibah Hussain and Danielle
Kehl, "Americans Pay Six Times More for Mobile Internet Dat:~ than the French," Slate, http://
www.slate.com/blogslfuturc_tensc/:z.o IJ/t o/1 r/itu_report_shows_americans_pa y_high_price_
for_mobile_imcrnet_data.hnnl (accessed October It, 201 3).
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According to rhe FCC, 96 percent of American housing units have two or
fewer choices for wireline Internet access,J,; In a 2010 report, Yochai Benkler
determined that American broadband's relative decline stems from policy differences with other democracies,J7 suggesting that this American exceptionalism is primarily political, with telecom corporations exerting disproportionate
control over the policy process.
Because Internet service providers (ISPs) have little incentive to make the
necessary investments to address these structural problems, one first step
toward increasing capacity is to subsidize the build-om of new networks that
can compete with the incumbents.JR Susan Crawford makes a compelling
argument that these digital communications industries wield such influence
over the political process that aggressive structural intervention in the form of
breaking up monopolies and oligopolies is highly unlikely for the immediate
future. However, she sees hope in a smattering of community-owned Internet
networks that provide cheap and reliable broadband services to their residents.
Therefore, one arrow in the quiver against telecom monopolies should include
community broadband initiatives- at least in the 30 stares that have not yet
passed laws making it extremely difficult or impossible for municipalities to
offer these services, essentially ensuring a captive market for companies such
as Comcast,J~ These locally owned and controlled wireless or municipal fiber
Internet networks could be operated through community media centers supported by local and national tax revenues. These centers could be housed in post
offices or public libraries to serve as hubs for community media production,4°
,. Federal Communications Commission, Cormectirrg America: T/Je National Broadband Plan,
~oro http:l/download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf (accessed October I I,
l.OIJ).

'' Yochai Bcnklcr, Next Ge11eration Cotmectivity: A Review of Broadband ltztenret Tra11sitions
a11d l'olicy from Around the World (Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center for Internet & Society at
Harvard University, 1010).
J • For example, the governments of Japan, South Korea, and Sweden made significant investments
in building out broadband infrastructure. See Saul H:msell, "The Broadband Gap: Why Do
They Have More Fiber?" New York Times, March I 1, ~009. President Obama's "broadband
stimulus," which viewed the Internet as a crucial infrastructure, was arguably a first tiny step in
this direction but insufficient.
1• Crawford, Captive Audiettce, 156 .
.., A version of the Independent Media Center (IMC or lndymedia) experiment of the early :z.ooos
'auld serve as a potential model, though it would require reliable funding instead of relying on
all-volunteer labor, whkh challenged many IMCs' sustainability. Sec Victor Pickard, "Assessing
the Radical Democracy of lndymedia: Discursive, Technical and Institutional Constructions,"
Critical Studies i11 Media Commzmicatio11 13, no. I (1006): I9-3B; Victor Pickard, "United yet
Autonomous: lndymcdia and the Struggle to Sustain a Radical Democratic Network," Media
Culture & Society 18, no. 3 (:z.oo6): .315-3 6; Victor Pickard, "Cooptation and Cooperation:
Institutional Exemplars of Democratic Internet Technology," New Media a11d Society ro (4)
(:z.oo8): 615-645· One important model is the Urbana fMC, which purchased the downtown
post office building. in addition to providing 'ommunity wireless services, this space produces a
wide range of media, including a monthly print publication, an LPFM station, and a community
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Analogous to the 1940s debates over broadcasters' commercial and political
power over their programming content, today the gatekeeping capacity of ISPs
is in question. Specifically, this debate hinges on whether the Internet should be
protected according to "net neutrality"- essentially preventing ISPs from interfering with online content. This controversy traces back to a number of antecedents, including the 2005 Supreme Court's Brand X decision, which permitted the
FCC's dubious 2002 reclassification of the Internet (specifically cable modem
services) from a carefully regulated telecommunications service to a lightly regulated "information service." Without explicit net neutrality protections, ISPs can
potentially interfere with users' online activities by slowing or blocking specific
kinds of content, creating "fast lanes" for prioritized services, and thereby fundamentally altering the Internet's basic design principles. 4' The net neutrality
debate's long, ongoing saga is beyond this book's scope; its most recent permutation has left the issue in limbo after the DC Circuit Court of Appeals struck
down the weak protections that the FCC had enacted in 2010Y Verizon, who
successfully sued the FCC to have the rules thrown out, used an all-roo-familiar
negative liberty argument that communication firms typically use to protect capital and shield themselves from regulatory intervention. It stated that "contrary
to the FCC's assertion, broadband providers are speakers protected by the First
Amendment."4J Also problematic, open Inrernet protections have not thus far
fully pertained to mobile services, which increasing numbers of Americans use
to access the Internet. To maintain a free-flowing and democratic digiral media
system, net neutrality should be mandatory across platforms.H However, while
news website. See S:~scha Meinrnth and Victor l'icknrd, "The Rise of the Intranet Ern: Media,
Research and Community in an Age of Communications Revolution," in Globalizatioll a11d
Comm11nicative Democracy: C01111111mity Media in the ~1St Ce11t11ry, ed. Kevin Howley (London:
Sage, 1009), 317-40. Another institutional exemplar is Philadelphia's Media Mobilizing Project,
which uses new communication technologies to produce media in coordmanon with poor and
working d:~ss communities. See Todd Wolfson, Digital Rebcllwm The Birth of the Cyber Left
(Urbana: University of Illinois l'ress, 2.014).
4' Arguing that net ncutr:~hty is 3Ctually :1 type of ancient nondiscriminatory law - essentially
common carriage - :~daptcd to twenty-first-century infr:~structurc, Tim Wu rcmmds us that a
" vibrant inform:~tion economy cannot countenance discnminnrion at n level so basic as trans·
mission on a public network." Wu, The Master Switd1, 31 r.
•• Veri:to11 Commumcatio11s Inc. v. Federal Commtmicatiotts Commissio11, DC Cir., No, 1 J- IJSS 1
III41I4 .
'' joint Reply Brief for Verizon :~nd Mcrropcs, Veri;:o11 v. Federal CommtmicattOIIS Commissio11,
No. 1 1- 13 55 (DOC filed Dec. :u, 101 1), p. 2.. Elsewhere Vcrizon :~rgues that these rules "infringe
bro:~dband providers' speech by, :~mong other things, stripping providers of control over which
speech they tr:~nsmir :~nd how they tr:~nsmir it," p. z.6. See also Paul Barbag:~llo, "Vcrizon First
Amendment Challenge of Net Neutrality Tests Century of Regul:uion," Bloombcrg,j:~nuary 14,
1013 http://www.bna.com/verizon-firsr-:1mendment·n17179B710I4/. In irs decision, the court
ultim:~tcly did not address Verizon's First Amendment argument.
" This requires reclassifying broadband ns a telccommunic:~tions service protected by Title II of
the Communications Act, thereby reaffirming the FCC's regulatory :~uthority over Internet com·
munications. Sec S:~scha Mcinrarh :~nd Victor P1ckard, "The New Network Ncutmlity: Criteria
for Internet Freedom," l11temational journal of Communicatio11s Law a11d Poltcy t1 (1008):
2.15-43. Of course, other kinds of online discrimination nnd preferential trealment not involving
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having an open digital infrastructure is necessary, it does not specifically address
the American journalism crisis, which I turn to next.
Taking the Profit out of News
American journalism lives a double life as a public service and a commodity. It is the latter identity - news as a profitable commercial entity - that has
collapsed in recent years. With nearly all signs suggesting a slow but sure
demise for advertising-supported journalism - seen most spectacularly in the
newspaper industry - traditional news organizations continue to flounder for
a last-minute rescue, whether through digital paywall models or some other
technological fix. The Internet, paradoxically, is seen as both journalism's
destroyer and its potential savior. The latter view assumes that new digital
media will somehow combine with market forces and organically produce
new models for citizen journalism. Thus far, little evidence suggests that this
will manifest at sufficient levels. Saving commercial journalism from itself or rather, extricating its good parts - must happen quickly before its slide
toward ruin leaves behind hundreds of hollowed-out newsrooms. For while
its business model has collapsed, journalism's public service mission is as vital
today as any point in history. Salvaging it, however, will require public policy
interventions.
Even modest policy changes could bolster public service journalism.
Lessening market failure within the digital realm as described previously would
greatly benefit news media, but policy reforms aimed specifically at journalistic institutions are also necessary. A three-pronged approach to reinventing
journalism would involve new tax laws, subsidies for a new public media sys·
tern, and research and development efforts for new digital models. Together,
these initiatives would remove or lessen profit pressures and help restore journalism's public service mission. An immediate stopgap measure like tweaking tax laws would help struggling news outlets transition to new low· and
nonprofit business models while also eliminating barriers to new ventures,4s A
number of promising initiatives have been waiting for months and years to be
granted nonprofit status, and the IRS's inexplicable delays have caused unnecessary hardship for these news organizations. 46 Other worthwhile tax reform

lSI's occur with other large Internet firms, including those that often side with public interest
groups during net neutrality disputes such as Google.
" For a discussion of these tax models, as well as historical models such as municipal-owned
newspapers, sec Victor Pickard, " Can Government Support the Press? Historicizing and
Internationalizing a Policy Approach to the journalism Crisis.," Communication R.evietv I 4,
no. 1. (1.011): 7.3-95.
•• josh Steams, "No News Is Bad News for Nonprofit journalism," Yes Magazine, May ,3, 1.01 :z..
http://www.ycsmngazine.org/pcople-powcr/no·ncws-is-bad-news-for-nonprofit-journalism. Sec
also: "The IRS and Nonprofit Media: Toward Creating a More Informed Public," Council on
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proposals have been floated in recent years bur have yet to receive a full public
hearing. 4 7 The finer derails of tax law might not be the most compelling activist
issue, but reforming them could induce both old and new media institutions to
provide public service journalism.
Strengthening the already existing public media system would be a strong
first step toward funding an alternative media infrastructure insulated from
the commercial pressures that accelerated our journalism crisis. Right now, the
United States is a global outlier among democracies in how little it funds public
broadcasting.4MThe current crisis presents a rare opportunity to revitalize and
repurpose this public media infrastructure by dedicating it ro local news gath·
ering as well as international and state-level news. Existing community and
public radio stations could transition into multimedia centers (as many already
are) that create digital media across multiple platforms and support investigative reporters in local communities, replacing the news media production
often vacated by commercial newspapers. Funding for public media should be
guaranteed over the long term and carefully shielded from political pressures,
a process that would require removing it from the congressional appropri·
arion process. A permanent trust could be supported by spectrum fees paid
by commercial operators, a small consumer tax on electronics, or something
equivalent to the universal service fund added to monthly phone bills. In the
meantime, the United States could allocate targeted subsidies toward increasing public media's capacity, reach, diversity, and relevance. These subsidies
could help broaden public media to include not just the Public Broadcasting
Service and National Public Radio but also low-power FM stations, public
access cable channels, and independent community Web sites, as well as the
aforementioned community media centers.
All of these efforts would benefit from R&D investments in new digital start·
ups.~~ Similar to private initiatives like the Knight News Challenge,'o this federal
R&D program could nurture promising journalistic experiments to help them
become self-sustaining. Recent years have witnessed numerous creative propos·
als to jump-start innovative forms of multi-platform public media, including
federal support for a journalism jobs program based on the Americorps
model,' ' instituting $2.oo tax vouchers to put toward raxpayers' choice of
Foundations, March 4, :1.01 ; , http://www.cof.org/nonprofitmcdia?ltcmNumbcr=r 87o8#sthash.
NHD 3YBUi.dpuf.
• 1 St-e, for example, Senator Ben Cardin's proposed bill, the "Newspaper Revitalization Act of
:1.0 0 9 ," to help struggling newspapers become non profits. See also hss op·cd "A Plan to Save Our
Free Press," \Vashi11gto11 Post, April ;, :1.009.
•• Rodney Benson and Matthew Powers, Public Media and Politica/fT,dependmce: Lesso11s for the
Future of ]Ditmalism from arou11d the \Vorld (Washington, DC: Free Press, :1.0 I I) .
., Discussed in Pickard ct al., "Saving the News," 44- 5.
10 The Knight News Challenge is an annual contest offering rewards of between Sr,ooo and
Sr,ooo,ooo to promote innovative ideas in "news and information."
II Picbrd er :~1., "Saving the News," 43-4.
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media,s- repurposing funds currently used for international broadcasting,B
charging commercial broadcasters for their use of the public spectrum,H and
having journalism schools take over news operations abandoned by professional
organizations,H
Given corporate liberrarianism's control over American political discourse,
such a policy reorientation may seem like a nonsrarter, especially when conservative politicians routinely targer public broadcasting for proposed budget
cuts - at a time, no less, when the need for public media should be most selfevident. But polling data consistently show high levels of support for public
broadcasting,J6 suggesting one clear example where the corporate libertarian paradigm is not based on popular consent. Regardless, establishing new
reforms and expanding public media are possible only if we create a counternarrative to corporate liberrarianism.
Beyond Corporate Libertarianism
How we think about journalism is largely determined by how much we buy
into a corporate libertarian paradigm that sees news and information primarily as commodities whose existence is dictated by their profitability. If we see
journalism first and foremost as a public service or public good, then it must
be sustained regardless of market support. Thus, an argument for subsidizing
public media can be condensed to the following points.
• Despite its continued commercial devaluation, journalism produces a public
good that is essential to democracy.
• The advertising model rhat has subsidized this public good for the past
125 years is no longer sustainable.
• No new commercial models are emerging that offset the loss of journalism
within legacy media.
• Once society acknowledges rhis market failure, the need for policy intervenrions to promote public service journalism and to encourage new journalistic experiments becomes paramount.
,. McChesney and Nichols, The Death a11d Life of American Joumalism, zoi-l.06.
" Shawn l'owers, "U.S. lnremational Broadcasting: An Untapped Resource for Ethnic and
Domestic News Organizations," in \'i!rll the Last Reporter Please Tum 0111 the Lights? The
Collapse of Journalism atrd \Vhat Ca11 Be Dorre to Fi.l: It, cd. Robert McChesney nnd Victor
Pickard (New York: New Press, l.OI J ), I38-1 50.
" Benjamin lennett, Tom Glnisycr, and Snschn Mcinmth, Public Media, Spectmm Policy, a11d
Rethi11kirrg Public lrrterest Obligatio/Is for the zut Cerrtury (Wnshington, DC: New America
Foundation, june 2.0 1 :z.).
11 Leonnrd Downie nnd Michael Schudson, "The Reconstruction of American journnlism," in
Will the Last Reporter Please nm1 011t tbe Lights? The Collapse of]o11malism and What Cmr
Be Do11e to Fi.'C It, ed. Robert McChesney and Victor Pickard (New York: New Press, 1on),
ss-90.
'' Public Brondcasting System, Today's 1'85: Trusted, Valued, Essentinl, l.OlJ http://www-tc.pbs.
org/aboutlmcdin/about/cms_page_medtn/6l.Sf:z.o t3 Trust% 1oBrochure.pdf (nccessed October
II, :Z.OIJ).
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This reframing of the journalism crisis allows for commercial and noncommercial models to coexist by restoring balance between profit-making and democratic imperatives and creating a mixed, structurally diverse media system
that is not overly dependent on market relationships. The historical record
as well as recent events would suggest that a wholly commercial news system
focused on advertising revenue optimization and profit maximization cannot
easily withstand market fluctuations and is inadequate in supporting democratic society's communication requirements.
Of course, advocating public subsidies does not mean that the state should
exert direct control over media; rather, it should help foster the structural
conditions necessary for public service media to thrive. Despite Americans'
discomfort with press subsidies, a growing body of academic research demonstrates that publicly owned media and government-subsidized privately owned
media are no less critical of government than non-subsidized privately owned
media.H Critical journalism and continued media independence- despite state
subsidies -are exemplified by the often-confrontational BBC. Arguably, in liberal democracies with predominantly commercial media systems that overly
rely on access to official sources (such as politicians), the state can play a larger
role in shaping the news than it does in publicly subsidized media systems.
Subsidies might liberate journalists to become more autonomous and thus
more adversarial toward those in power. Drawing from a number of respected
studies showing a strong correlation between public media systems and vibrant
democracies, recent research has convincingly debunked the arguments that
public press subsidies automatically create a slippery slope toward totalitarianism.'H Likewise, research suggests that subsidies do not encourage subservient,
uneducated publics; often the opposite appears to be true.s~
Over the past decade, American scholars have begun to examine the subsidy
approach more closely,M> and proposals for press subsidies long considered offlimits are gradually being reconsidered, as evidenced by a number of reports

Rodney Benson, "Public Funding and Journalistic Independence: What Does Research Tell Us?"
in Will the Last Reporter Please Tum Out the Lights? The Collapse of]ouma/ism and What Can
Be Do11e to Fix It, ed. Robert McChesney and Victor Pickard (New York: New Press, 20ll),
3I4- 19. For a fine example of this research, see also Rodney Benson, Sbapiug lmmigratio11
News: A Fre11ch-America11 Compariso11 (New York: Cambridge Univcl'$ity Press, 1013 ).
'' Roberr McChesney and Victor Pickard, "News Medin as Political Institutions," in Ha11dbook
of Political Cormmmicatio11 Theories, ed. Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2 0 I4).
" james Curran, Shanto Iyengar, Anker Brink Lund, and lnka Salovaara-Moring, "Medin System,
Public Knowledge and Democracy," Europeatt Jotmtal of Comtmmicatioll 2.4 (2009): 5-16. See
also Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and Geert Linnebank, "Public Support for the Medin: A Six-Country
Overview of Direct and Indirect Subsidies" (Reuters lnstirute for the Study of Journalism, Oxford
University, 2 0 I I ), http://reutersinstitute. pol itics.ox.nc.uk/pu blicationslrisj-rcporrs.html.
"' I synthesize much of this scholarship in "The USA: Unfounded Fears of Press Subsidies," in State
Aid for Newspapers - Theories, Cases, Actio11s, ed. Paul Murschetz {Berlin and Heidelberg:
Springer-Verlag, 20 I4 ), 3 57-71.
I'
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and op-eds.~' Even as these proposals incur wrath from those who still view
press subsidies as dangerous, the beginnings of a new "popular front" consensus among liberal and radical intellectuals might be crystallizing around
what James Curran refers to as "public reformism." 61 This position calls for
strengthening public media to sustain the journalism that the private sector
no longer supports. Since public media's future is bound up in the political
appeal of state activism, proposals for supporting journalism must convince
broad constituencies that subsidies would not influence the press's editorial
viewpoints or news coverage. All public media subsidies should be based on
complete transparency, systems of accountability, and multiple firewalls to prevent them from becoming instruments of the stare. For example, one potential
safeguard is to mandate a new kind of "ascertainment" by which subsidized
media institutions must consult local communities to find out what stories
residents would like to see covered. Reform proposals also should emphasize
that they are not focused on simply propping up corporate incumbents and
paper-based print media.
To be clear, the objective should always be stated as protecting journalism,
not necessarily legacy newspapers. Few proponents of subsidies are advocating a direct bailouc of the commercial media system or the preservation of
traditional news organizations as they currently exist. Furthermore, sentimentality about ink-stained fingers notwithstanding, we should think proactively
about digital journalism and aim beyond saving "dead tree" broadsheets. A
restructured newspaper industry combined with a fully funded public media
infrastructure could bring into existence, with time, not just reform, bur a
transformed media system, one less beholden to commercial interests and more
accountable to diverse communities.
Presently, the politics to drive these policies are absent, and as long as the
corporate libertarian paradigm that ascended in the 1940s remains predominant, they likely will remain so. Recent developments in media law and policy
have only strengthened this paradigm as corporations are increasingly empowered and emboldened to act as political agents, seeking to undermine even weak
redistributive mechanisms in U.S. society. ~! Moreover, the case for government

•• See, for example, Federal Trade Commission, "Potential l'olicy Recommendations to Support
the Reinvention of Journalism" (discussion draft, Washington, DC, :!.o r o ); Lee Bollinger,
"Journalism Needs Government's Help," Waf{ Street Journal, July 14, :!.OI O. Lee Bollinger expands on these arguments in Uninbib1ted, Robust, a11d \Vide-Open: A Free Press for a New
Century {New York : Oxford University Press, :!.o r ot.
•• James Curran, wThe Future of Journalism," ]oumalism Studies 11, no. 4 (1.0 10): 4 7 1 .
' 1 This is especially true a fter the 10 10 Supreme Courr decision in Citi::.ms United v. FEC, which
stands to reorder the political landscape along corporate libertarian lines by unleashing nearly unlimited and unaccountable corporate influence in politica l campaigns. For 3 penetrating
analysis of this and related phenomena, see John Nichols and Robert McChesney, Dolfarocracy:
How the Moucy and Media Elcctio11 Complex Is Destroyi11g America (New York: Nation
Books, l.OIJ).
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intervention has been further weakened in the public imagination with increasing disclosures of run-amok state surveillance via digital media. While dismantling this surveillance state must become a key policy battle in the years ahead,
a progressive role for state intervention is still possible and necessary. After
decades of American media policy largely favoring incumbent media corporations, a rare chance has emerged to create a truly public media system.
Media Reform Deferred
Ideas themselves do not lead directly to social change; reform requires the
energy of grassroots movements, as well as long-term organizing and institution-building. In considering lessons from the postwar settlement's ascendancy and prospects for moving beyond it, a long view is useful. The history
of media reform is one of missed opportunities and deferred alternatives, but
the purpose of this research is not to mourn a lost golden age or to lament
what could have been. Rather it is meant to link previous struggles to alternative futures, to learn lessons from past failures, and to see contemporary
media reform movements as part of a long historical tradition, one that continually engages with the vexing intersections of media, democracy, and policy. Radical policy formations and ideas for new models typically exist at the
margins of political discourse. It is incumbent upon scholars to bring those
alternatives to light and to challenge dominant ideologies and relationships.
The history discussed in this book is more than a declension narrative. In
answering the "How did we get here?" question, this history reminds us about
forgotten options - lost possibilities that we recover not only to correct the
historical record by reclaiming agency and resistance but also to inspire future
reform efforts. As we look back to the paths not taken, we may consider
changing course.~~
Just as the New Deal era has been described as a period of chaotic experimentation, our current critical juncture calls for testing alternative models.
But without a structural analysis we are left to fight against the symptoms of
a fundamentally flawed media system instead of root causes. This evasion of
structural reform in the 1940s poised newspapers for their current dissolution.
However, a possible silver lining to the crisis is that new journalistic models
are becoming more viable. Unlike in the 1940s, when prominent figures in the
media industry viewed any suggestion of structural reform via state intervention with knee-jerk suspicion and hostility, now some industry leaders, perhaps
out of desperation, indicate a greater willingness to experiment, as do many
working journalists whose jobs are at stake. This trend may combine with a
•• I discuss some of rhc. c rhcm~s in "Rcvisiring rhe Road Nor Taken: A Social Dcmocraric Vision
of rhe l'rcss," in Will tbt: Last Reporter Please Tum Out the Lights? The Collapse of]oumalism
aud What Can Be Do 11~ to Fix It, ed. Robert McChesney and Victor Pickard (New York: New
Press, 1011 ), 174-84.
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resurgent media reform movement to build the crucial public support that was
lacking or disconnected from policy makers in the 1940s.
Concerns about unaccountable media monopolies and government complicity articulated in the 1940s continue to galvanize media reformers and public
outrage. In 2003, nearly 3 million people wrote letters to the FCC contesting proposed plans for loosening ownership restrictions."' In 2oo6, more than
r million people petitioned Congress to protect a then-obscure policy called
net neutrality to maintain a nondiscriminatory Internet/'" In 2012, 4·5 million people signed a petition to roll back two proposed Internet piracy bills
that would have given government and corporations tremendous power over
Web content. 67 With increasing numbers of Americans attempting to renegotiate the power dynamics between communities and media companies, uncovering the origins, contingencies, and contradictions of this relationship is timely.
This study strives to recuperate lost alternatives by presenting a usable history
and showing that "the public interest" is still a meaningful category in the
digital era.
This analysis reaches the uncomfortable conclusion that the current commercial model for media is not adequately serving democracy. In particular,
commercial journalism is failing; the normative framework of socially responsible media has too often failed; and the market-driven build-out of communication infrastructures has been insufficient. It is unreasonable to think that
we can awaken tomorrow and jettison the entire apparatus. However, it is reasonable - in fact, it is absolutely necessary - for policy makers, media reform
activists, and other stake-holding constituencies to begin pushing for structural
alternatives. For this goal to be realized, we will have to renegotiate the postwar
settlement, and to do this, we must know its history. The postwar settlement
for American media marked a failure of reformers' vision of media democracy,
one privileging access over corporate profits and diversity over commercial
values. It is this vision that has been deferred, still awaiting its moment.
History shows that democrarization can occur when government, pushed
by social movements, enters the fray on the public's behalf. More than seventy
years ago, an opportunity was lost. Instead of confroming the problem for what
it was- the result of deeply systemic flaws endemic to commercial media- policy makers either avoided this task or were squelched by pro-industry counterattacks, especially red-baiting. Ultimately they fell back on palatable halfway
measures, helping ensure that future generations of Americans would be forced
to face similar crises. The American public has inherited the legacy of policy

•• For ll history of the enrly 2.ooos media reform movement, see Eric Klinenberg, Fighting for Air:
The Battle to Control America's Media (New York: Mctropolitnn Books, 2.007).
"" Stephnnie Kirchgnessner, P:mi Wnldmcir and Richard Waters, "Google Action Tests Power of
Cash vs Votes in Washington," Filraucial Times, july r8, 2.oo6.
"' SOrA Petition Gets Millions of Signatures as Internet Piracy Legislation Protests Continue,
Washington Post, Jnnuary J 9, 2.01 :..

Conclusion

2.J I

decisions from the 1940s that left intact a nominally socially responsible,
self·regulated commercial media system. This corporate libertarian paradigm
would prefigure much of the American media system for decades. The time has
arrived for a renegotiated social contract. Instead of being constrained by past
policy failures, we must learn from them and move forward with bold new
models.

